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Abstract 
This paper explores the use of system modelling as an approach for appraising critical infrastructure systems. It 
reports on focus group findings with relation to the system modelling aspects of a critical infrastructure security 
analysis and modelling framework. Specifically, this discussion focuses on the interpretations of a focus group in 
terms of the likely benefits or otherwise of system visualisation. With the group focusing on its perceived value as an 
educational tool in terms of providing an abstract visualisation representation of a critical infrastructure system 
incident. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The complexity and interconnection of modern critical infrastructure systems and their associated dependency issues 
raises a number of considerations with relation to undertaking security analysis and modelling of critical 
infrastructure systems. This research focuses specifically on the utilisation of system modelling as a means of 
producing a visualisation of the system structure, architecture, function and its perceived value or otherwise as an 
educational tool.  
Initially, a discussion regarding modelling of critical infrastructure systems is undertaken to scope the issues of 
modelling such systems as a prelude to reviewing and reporting the findings of a focus group. In this research 
instance, Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) was the applied system modelling approach used to develop an abstract 
visualisation of the subject system utilising CPNTools (Jensen 2008) software.  
Specifically, this paper reports on the outcomes and subsequent determinations of a focus group conducted to 
analyse and appraise a practical application utilising the security analysis and system modelling approach of the 
TARDIS framework (Pye & Warren 2009). The intention of the focus group was to examine and critique the CPN 
applied system modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework, as applied to a case study of a critical infrastructure 
system incident.  
However, it is not the intention to discuss in detail the applied case study, but to report the merit of modelling a 
critical infrastructure system incident as a means of visualising the system status at various stages. Therefore, this 
paper is pursuant to reporting the focus group findings and the merit of utilising system visualisation via CPN 
modelling with CPNTools, of a critical infrastructure system incident. 
MODELLING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCUTRE SYSTEMS 
The functional complexity and interconnectedness of today’s critical infrastructure systems and their structural 
information systems and communication networks, poses many challenges to modelling and analysing their security 
aspects. Particularly, in terms of interpreting the survivability, reliability and resilience characteristics of critical 
infrastructure systems and the services they provide to modern society. In essence it is the heterogeneous system 
environment and the interactive nature of these systems that presents several theoretical and practical challenges to 
modelling, predicting, simulating and analysing the causal behaviours and security factors. Additionally, the 
influence of external environmental factors and the potential impacts of interdependency relationships as 
infrastructures evolve and change in structure, or changing operational regulations governing critical infrastructure 
systems, are all important considerations (Brown et al 2004). As the interactions and responses are neither 
universally applicable nor transferable between independent, single critical infrastructure systems or interconnected 
multiple system configurations. The fact remains that critical infrastructure systems comprise a heterogeneous 
mixture of dynamic, interactive, non-linear elements, unscheduled discontinuations and numerous other influential 
impositions and behaviours (Macdonald & Bologna 2003). 
The challenges of analysing and modelling such large-scale systems, including their dependency relationships with 
other systems and their non-linear and time-dependent behaviour, remain largely undetermined or ill defined. 
According to McDonald and Bologna (ibid), mathematical models of critical infrastructure systems are vague and 
there are no applicable methodologies for assessing and comprehending the intricacies of critical infrastructure 
systems. Then add to this the effects of human interaction and the susceptibility to instigate failure or adaptively 
recover and manage wayward systems and it becomes self-evident, the difficulty of producing a concise system 
visualisation.  
Therefore, developing a representative system modelling that provides an acceptable visualisation of the subject 
system requires a deeper contextual understanding of the system, in order to effectively scope the system under 
investigation. This is not merely about just modelling the topology and dynamics of these large complex network 
systems, but incorporating the consequential rationality of human thinking, responses and reactions (Macdonald & 
Bologna 2003, Peters et al 2008). Moreover, there are additional complexity factors with network systems that are 
inherently difficult to comprehend (McDonald & Bologna 2003): 
 Structural complexity – increasing number of nodes and links between nodes; 
 Network evolution – the structural linkage which could change over time; 
 Connection diversity – the links between nodes could have different weightings, directions or capacities; 
 Dynamical complexity – the nodes could be non-linear dynamical systems; 
 Node diversity – there could be many different node types; and 
 Meta-complication – the various complications can influence other network nodes. 
Additionally, critical infrastructures can be intractable systems that are difficult to manage, operate with consistency 
and maintain. They are typically large, physical and geographically distributed systems that are highly diverse and 
networked, consisting of system within system structures with respective performance variations. There are few 
system modelling tools that can characterise these infrastructures as whole or decompose the system structures 
(Schulman & Roe 2007). 
Yet critical infrastructure analysis and modelling utilising simulation and optimisation-based techniques have played 
a part in examining potential interdiction options, through providing insights to mitigate facility loss and enable 
prioritisation of security strengthening efforts. Thereby system modelling simulation as an optimisation technique 
has proven invaluable in the analysing vulnerabilities through the examination of a range of applied impacts, with 
either implicit or explicit notions of optimising performance (Murray & Grubesic 2007). 
Therefore, in the context of assessing system reliability and vulnerability through monitoring the simulation models 
of network nodes or links that are compromised, this enables corresponding changes in connectivity or performance 
to be visualised and documented. Although a final important consideration is the interdependency relationships that 
exist between differing critical infrastructure systems. Mussington (2002) identifies these relationships as a point at 
which a shortfall of knowledge for improving critical infrastructure security capabilities is incomplete and suggests 
that part of the problem is the complexity of relationships that is difficult to model. However, system modelling is a 
first step in analysing and answering persistent questions about the ‘real’ vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure 
systems (Brown et al 2004).  
Therefore, it is the intention to seek to determine the merits of system modelling as a visualisation approach towards 
delivering discernable understanding and comprehension, with regard to analysing the security and functional 
aspects of critical infrastructure systems. 
FOCUS GROUP RATIONALE 
The principle rationale of the focus group was to validate the TARDIS framework and discover the suitability or 
otherwise of undertaking security analysis and modelling of the applied critical infrastructure system incident. The 
intent was to gather feedback in terms of incident response management, contingency planning and to elicit 
responses with regard to emergency management education and training approaches. 
The composition of the focus group consisted of five invited participants who voluntarily consented to take part 
anonymously. The opinions, comments and interpretations captured in the moderated discussion undertaken during 
the focus group, consist of participant feedback from the perspective of an Australian federal government agency. 
FOCUS GROUP OVERVIEW 
The focus group comprised of two parts: the first consisted of presenting an explanation of the TARDIS framework 
system modelling intent and function, including a presentation of the critical infrastructure system incident case 
study. This was necessary to provide clarity and context along with enabling participants to ask any questions. The 
second part of the focus group was a moderated discussion inviting participants to review and critique system 
modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework, utilising CPNTools. The purpose of the moderated discussion was to 
capture and record participant comments and opinions with a view to examining the captured data to determine 
framework validation in this context. 
FOCUS GROUP REVIEW FINDINGS 
The review findings are the product of focus group responses to the TARDIS framework in consideration of the 
critical infrastructure incident case study. The data points relate directly to the following discussion themes: 
1. Application of the TARDIS Framework; 
2. TARDIS System Models; 
3. Education and Training Factors; and 
4. Strategic Management. 
The collation of comments with regard to each theme forms the basis of the expanded discussions and 
determinations relating to each point and particular discussion theme. 
Application of the TARDIS Framework 
This moderated discussion theme focuses solely on the system modelling component of the TARDIS framework 
utilising CPNTools. It centres on the perceived value or otherwise of the system representation and visualisation 
approach used from an emergency management educational training perspective. 
Initial interpretation 
Participants were generally positive in their views regarding the system modelling, particularly in its suitability for 
systematically critiquing network-like critical infrastructure systems, in-depth case study development approaches 
and drill-down aspects including the decomposition of system models. Furthermore, the system visualisation offered 
an incident auditing approach suitable for investigating aspects of responsibility and decision-making, which would 
be invaluable for post-incident system analysis and as a critique for later educational and training purposes. 
Summary findings 
In terms of the usefulness of the system modelling, participants were of the belief that as a system diagnostic and 
network modelling tool, CPNTools was useful in providing an analysis and diagrammatical representation of an 
historical case study. Additionally, participants found they could appreciate the structure, functions and pinpoint the 
system problems, with one participant suggesting that the TARDIS framework had a possible business continuity 
planning application. Furthermore, participants thought the system modelling approach had a powerful ‘storytelling’ 
aspect in the context of visualising the system and its lower-level subsystems and components. In fact one of the 
aspects of the TARDIS framework system modelling approach that participants recognised as an important and 
valuable feature was the capability for decomposing the system in both the analysis and modelling phases. This 
enabled the examination of the system at differing levels of detail from an overall system perspective to an isolated 
view of the critical infrastructure system. Participants noted that system decomposition aspects of CPNTools within 
the TARDIS framework were a strength that had the potential to deliver valuable insights and understanding through 
its visual system representation.  
Other strengths were that the system modelling delivered a means of auditing an incident that would enable scrutiny 
when reviewing decisions taken, to analyse their impact and consequences in response to the incident. As one 
participant explained, this was essential to investigating decision accountability and incident management responses, 
particularly with the private ownership of critical infrastructure systems and the responsibility for actions taken. 
Therefore, reviewing incident response practices is important to improving the decision-making process and 
interpreting the appropriate responses and actions. 
Additionally, participants were positive in their assessment of the system modelling capability to decompose the 
system to its lower-level structures and functions in terms of visualising aspects of security analysis, scenario 
development and system composition. Participants felt this feature delivered crucial insights into the architectural, 
structural, functional and incident location from a more visual and abstract perspective. 
Furthermore, participants felt that system modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework would be very helpful for 
educational and training purposes in disaster response, contingency planning, emergency management and 
coordination. In terms of identifiable weaknesses, participants remarked that there was a lack of temporal feedback, 
particularly in the system model simulations. Event timings as an overlay, would illustrate the case study system 
changes over the timeframe of the critical infrastructure system incident, thus providing an appreciation of what 
happened and when. Participants felt this was a particularly important aspect, as time is a critical influence in 
incident response decisions in terms of the status of the system. Additionally, participants felt that the incorporation 
of incident timing would enhance the teaching and learning aspects for emergency management training purposes 
too. As mapping incident timeframes to changing system status dynamics is particularly valuable in comprehending 
what happened and when, especially while reviewing an incident. However, time was not a feature of this case 
study, but it remains a consideration for future incorporation in critical infrastructure system case studies.  
Another weakness participants identified was that the CPN system modelling approach would not be particularly 
suited to analysing and modelling critical infrastructure incidents that were non-linear in nature. The problem is that 
the unpredictability of an evolving system incident consisting of multiple variables with multiple values would be 
difficult to interpret, than would otherwise be the case with a linear system event instance. Although, there is 
acknowledgement that there are interpretive compromises made in analysing and modelling with CPNTools to 
develop any visual representation of a critical infrastructure system incident.  
An important aspect of the moderated discussion was the application of CPN system modelling within the TARDIS 
framework, was in the context of its suitability as a pre-incident or post-incident analysis tool. Participant views 
were diverse, with some believing there was merit in applying the system modelling approach in a pre-incident 
context to hypothetically ascertain, plan and develop appropriate future incident responses, based on the lessons 
learnt from past events. Other participants thought the approach was better suited to a direct post-incident analysis. 
Enabling the review of an incident as it unfolded to interpret or identify the effectiveness or otherwise of existing 
incident contingency plans. Either approach of the TARDIS framework’s system modelling aspect had its 
advantages and disadvantages, although participants generally believed that it was better suited to looking at critical 
infrastructure system incidents from a historical perspective. 
Although there was scope for the predictive use of the TARDIS approach, the consensus was that its main strength 
lay in the analysis and modelling of critical infrastructure system incidents using historical case studies. The 
reasoning was that the TARDIS approach offered a means of formally undertaking numerous historical, complex 
system analyses that could determine likely decisions and courses of action taken. This would then enable 
contingency and disaster planners to appraise and reconfirm the decisions and actions taken during the event. This 
approach would identify weaknesses within the contingency response procedures and the actions taken during the 
incident. The outcome would enable the implementation of incremental changes to improve response measures and 
actions including decision-making processes, to establish better emergency response systems in the future. This is 
not to say that the TARDIS approach is not applicable to developing predictive outcomes as applied to hypothetical 
system incidents. However, it was felt that its strength lay in using system visualisations from a storytelling, 
educational and training perspective to analyse and model critical infrastructure system incidents after their 
occurrence.  
The feature of system decomposition within the modelling representations of the case study incident was a powerful 
feature of the CPNTools system modelling software. This provided clarity and comprehension to the focus group 
participants in terms of system architecture, structure, functionality, causal location and the consequential aspect of 
the incident. However, as participants suggested, the incorporation of temporal aspects as an overlay would 
demonstrate the changing characteristics of the system that would further enhance the visual practicality of system 
modelling and the subsequent simulation aspects. As an aside to the incorporation of time into the system models, 
there is a capability within CPN modelling for the incorporation of time into system model representations. In this 
instance, the consideration and inclusion of specific event timings within CPN system models was beyond the scope 
of this case study. 
TARDIS System Models 
This part of the moderated focus group discussion focused exclusively on the system modelling aspects and the 
visual representations developed in CPNTools utilising the principles of CPN system modelling. 
 Initial interpretation 
The participant’s responses to the system modelling capabilities (CPNTools) were very positive in terms of 
comprehending the system models, their structure and the capability to apply a system simulation to provide a 
deeper comprehension of system interactions and service delivery. Participants suggested that this system modelling 
approach also had further applications for producing meaningful visualisations related to modelling organisational 
contingencies. Particularly, human communication networks, decision-making structures and disaster management 
communication, particularly in educational and training terms for business organisations, local government, and 
state and federal government agencies. 
Summary findings 
The participants generally found CPN system models (using CPNTools) easy to follow and were able to 
comprehend what was happening within the system simulations and, more importantly could see the location of the 
causal system incident failure including the consequences. Additionally, participants felt the decomposition of 
system models into subsystem layers and components particularly helpful for comprehending complex structures 
and functions of the system, and enabling an enhanced explanation that was easy to follow and appreciate. 
Furthermore, a participant suggested that depending on the target audience and information required, the modelling 
aspect could offer managers an illustration of what can go wrong and the consequences. Additionally, it may provide 
system designers with information and feedback about the proposed system prior to construction and 
implementation, or to enhance training and educational exercises for emergency response management and 
contingency planning. 
Participants thought the system simulation feature of CPNTools system modelling was a very powerful aspect of the 
TARDIS framework, as it enabled them to appreciate visually the broader impacts and consequences to the 
community and business organisations. This coupled with the ability to drill-down and decompose the system to 
observe and isolate the system model at the subsystem and component level, was a valuable feature that assisted in 
enhancing their understanding and appreciation of the case study. Especially from the perspective of describing the 
interconnections with other associated systems and that the implementation of changes to model simulations enables 
users to see other speculative consequential outcomes of the system model. Participants expressed the opinion that 
these simulations offered valuable outcomes in the education and training environment, as students could see and 
speculate upon appropriate emergency responses and decision-making within the CPN system modelling 
environment.  
In summary, the focus group was positive in response to the system modelling approach and capabilities of the 
TARDIS framework, utilising CPNTools software as the system modelling environment. Furthermore, participants 
suggested extending this approach to modelling and mapping communication networks within organisations or 
businesses would prove useful for emergency management planning. Finally, they felt the system modelling 
approach was especially powerful in a visual sense for education and training purposes. 
Education and Training Factors 
The focus group were further asked to express opinions regarding the potential educational and training factors 
related to producing abstract visualisations of critical infrastructure system models. 
Initial interpretation 
The initial interpretation of the suitability of the system modelling visualisation approach utilised in the TARDIS 
framework is that it offers potential, in terms of security analysis and system modelling suitability for case study 
based training and instructional exercises. Participants thought this would prove useful for aiding the educational 
and training aspects of contingency planning and disaster recovery management. However, just where the focus lies 
requires further specifically targeted research and investigation to determine the application and likely benefits of 
using abstract visualisations of critical infrastructure systems in an educational context. 
Summary findings 
The intent of this discussion theme was to elicit comments regarding various impressions of the potential 
educational and training aspects of visually modelling critical infrastructure system incidents. Particularly, as the 
focus group participants’ expertise lay in education and training within the area of emergency management and 
contingency planning, it was therefore important to investigate its potential as an educational and training tool. A 
number of diverse views were expressed with regard to the potential usefulness of system modelling visualisation 
via CPNTools as an educational and training tool. This was from their expert perspective of educational trainers of 
emergency management and contingency planning and thus applied to analysing and modelling critical 
infrastructure system incidents. However, it was the consensus that further investigation and research to establish the 
TARDIS framework’s applicability as a tool for system modelling visualisation for education and training purposes, 
was required. 
 Strategic Management 
In an additional consideration, the focus group was asked to consider the system modelling and visualisation aspects 
of the TARDIS framework in terms of the strategic management from their perspective of emergency management 
education and training. 
Initial interpretation 
The intention was to seek participant thoughts on the extendibility of the TARDIS framework and its potential for 
delivering strategic management outcomes. Participants felt that the TARDIS approach would value-add to the 
development of strategic contingency plans for business organisations, through visualisation modelling and analysis 
of their crucial systems. However, it was deemed that this requires further research to assess this definitively. 
Summary findings 
One participant thought that although this was not the primary focus, its application did offer potential for 
identifying strategic management options in an operational context. This opinion was in the context of an 
operational team undertaking a review of the sequence of events that occurred within a particular critical 
infrastructure system incident to determine their significance. Additionally, another participant suggested that this 
would enable the operational team to appreciate the relationship between what they do and the system, particularly 
in consideration of action timeframes and how their communication structures and systems function under stress. 
The outcome of this type of assessment would enable operational teams to identify model and implement strategic 
management initiatives for improved cooperation, coordination and streamlining of their operational approach for 
the future.  
Further to the potential for identifying strategic management initiatives through system visualisation modelling via 
the TARDIS framework. The focus group felt that the approach would simplify system complexity through 
decomposition that to an extent may ‘demystify’ what actually occurs during an event and enhance incident 
appreciation. Strategically, this may be used as a teaching and learning resource tool to augment the development of 
individual decision-making skills, communication structures and incident management procedures necessary for 
delivering strategic and measured responses to future unexpected incidents. At this point, a participant highlighted 
that through the applied system modelling approach, it was visually obvious from a reliance perspective as to which 
of the geographically distant communities were directly impacted by the incident. The participants felt this would be 
very useful strategically in explaining and illustrating to system managers, owners and operators the importance of 
system availability and service provision to the wider community. 
Participants also felt that the visualisation of the system would value-add to the development of strategic 
contingency plans for business organisations through analysing and modelling their crucial systems. This would 
therefore enable businesses or government agencies to prioritise and strategically allocate resources to minimise the 
impact of an unexpected incident. Thereby potentially reducing any system downtime, loss of data or information 
and perhaps reduce the economic affects to governments, business, staff and community.  
Finally, in terms of governmental recovery management, participants thought the TARDIS approach would be an 
especially useful tool for undertaking reflective analysis after the event. Particularly utilising visualisation through 
system modelling to investigate and map the strategic communication pathways from government to individuals 
within affected communities. Especially, in terms of communicating essential information to community members 
before or after a significant emergency event to effectively manage the response and recovery processes to get the 
resources to where they are needed.  
This discussion theme elicited views and interpretations of the extensibility of the TARDIS framework system 
modelling approach in terms of identifying its possible adaptability to identifying, visualising and determining 
strategic management indicators that would be applicable to critical infrastructure system managers, owners and 
operators. Although, this was a digression for participants, away from considering the TARDIS framework as a 
security analysis and modelling tool for critical infrastructure system incidents. Focus group participants felt there 
was scope for extending and applying the TARDIS framework system modelling in relation to strategic management 
approaches that would be applicable to a number of levels. These included reviewing system managerial and 
incident response management and planning, through to strategically managing the processes and structures of 
communication with the community, in both pre-incident planning and post-incident recovery management contexts. 
FOCUS GROUP CONCLUSIONS 
The comments and opinions were constructive and reflected favourably on the benefits and outcomes of the system 
modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework as an approach for visualising and modelling of a critical infrastructure 
system incident. This was primarily evident in the favourable responses of the initial moderated discussion theme 
and further evidenced in subsequent themes in terms of system modelling, the decomposition feature of CPNTools 
and the added diagrammatical dimensions of the system simulation aspects.  
Another important conclusion was the reaffirmation of applying the TARDIS framework to historical case study 
incidents, although it was recognised that the framework was potentially applicable to hypothetical situations and 
predictive outcomes. Focus group participants felt the real strength and value lay in system modelling after the 
incident had occurred from a ‘lessons learnt’ perspective. In the context of an education and training tool, the 
opinion was that the system visualisation aspect of the TARDIS framework would value-add in the environment of 
education and training. This would be achieved by presenting alternative interpretations of incidents to develop 
analysis skills, understanding, comprehension and intuition of the potential consequences for critical infrastructure 
system failures.  
Participants identified the TARDIS framework’s relevance and suitability for case study system modelling depiction 
and suggested that it would also be suitable for analysing and visually modelling communication networks. 
Furthermore, the identification of strategic management issues had potential benefits for areas including: business 
contingency planning; emergency management response planning; emergency services; communication analysis and 
disaster recovery management of critical infrastructure systems in the Australian context. 
SYSTEM VISUALISATION OUTCOMES 
The primary outcome of this focus group investigation was that the visualisation of critical infrastructure system 
incident through system modelling offers an insight into developing greater understanding of the situation for system 
security and other analysis purposes. 
The analysis and modelling of critical infrastructure systems also offers the potential to determine interdependencies 
that are susceptible to cascading failures and identifying the divergent systems characteristics likely to exacerbate 
such interconnected infrastructure failures. Particularly, where the consumption of services is virtually immediate 
and no buffering or reserve of resources exists within infrastructures. This is particularly evident in 
telecommunications and electricity grids, where the immediacy of resource consumption can lead to potentially 
instantaneous cascading failures that impact other interdependent critical infrastructure systems. Alternatively, other 
infrastructures exhibit buffering characteristics similar to fuel and gas production and distribution infrastructures 
where physical supply resources have a level of reserve. Within these systems failure would not necessarily be 
instantaneous, but the effects would exacerbate over time (Svendsen & Wolthusen 2007).  
The differences in scenario characteristics and the characteristics of the critical infrastructure systems involved 
would by necessity require careful consideration in any modelling context. Particularly, when seeking to identify, 
predict and even quantify the effects of cascading incidents among interdependent infrastructure systems with regard 
to public policies that aim to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and especially that relate to critical 
infrastructure system security (Zimmerman & Restrepo 2006).  
According to Little (2003), applying analysis and modelling techniques to historical critical infrastructure incidents 
and events enables incremental improvements in prediction, forecasting and preparedness for future events and 
allows the instigation of new engineering approaches to design and construction. This enables critical infrastructure 
systems to become more robust to withstand the rigours of natural hazards, crippling failures, accidents and 
incidents as they occur in the future. 
Due to the increasing importance of secure critical infrastructure systems, there is an effort to develop analysis and 
modelling approaches that can accurately model critical infrastructure system behaviour, identify interdependencies 
and vulnerabilities to various threats. Some of the potential outcomes of analysis and modelling simulation 
approaches to assessing critical infrastructure systems may prove beneficial to governments, government agencies, 
military planning and defence and community expansion plans. This may reduce costs, enhance critical system 
redundancy, improve traffic flow, secure data and information protection and enable better preparation for and 
response to emergencies (Pederson et al 2006).  
Although in the context of Australian critical infrastructure system characteristics, there are modelling 
considerations that are particular to the visualisation of critical infrastructure systems. However, the ability to model 
these systems utilising a visual medium such as CPNTools, does offer another alternative that may provide 
invaluable insights into the security assessment and analysis of critical infrastructure system incidents. 
CONCLUSION 
The private and public owners in the infrastructure industry now have heightened security obligations with regard to 
the Australian national security status. This includes maintaining critical infrastructure system availability and 
supply of services to industry, business and the wider community, who are increasingly dependent and reliant on 
critical infrastructure systems. Further compounding this is the increasing interconnectedness between 
infrastructures via the information communication technologies that are increasingly pervading into these systems 
and therefore creating new interactions, interdependencies and dependency relationships. These technological 
innovations have thus introduced new risks and vulnerabilities enabling decentralised utility supply, distributed, 
autonomous control of network operations and information sharing provided by multifunctional information and 
communication infrastructures. 
The collection of interactive change processes in the Australian infrastructure industry is creating a new generation 
of critical infrastructures. These systems are so interwoven with new technologies that traditional approaches to 
managing spatial planning, policy making, regulation, technological, information and communication, physical and 
cyber security require rethinking. Similarly, governments and owners and operators must consider their interactions 
and connections with other critical and non-critical infrastructure systems. This is particularly relevant in terms of 
capacity allocation, service provision, system availability, planning and security as a function of changing economic, 
environmental and regulatory conditions.  
Therefore, understanding critical infrastructure system behaviour and security implications, vulnerabilities and 
mitigating identified security risks is a current concern of many nations, including Australia. In terms of a system 
thinking perspective, comprehending the design, operation, management and ultimately the security of any critical 
infrastructure system is important to conceptualising the system, its goals and performance. This applies equally to 
all differing levels of the greater system structure including the behaviour of the identified subsystems. Hence the 
ability to visualise the system through applied modelling techniques as discussed here, offers one approach to 
appraising critical infrastructure systems with visualisation.  
As Bentley (2006) intimates, critical infrastructure systems tend to be interdependent and even interconnected and 
systems failure – be it through natural disaster, accident or poor management – can bring entire communities and 
their industries and utilities to a grinding halt. Just imagine, for example, a major electricity failure, which these 
days can bring just about everything to a stop, from transport to workplaces, water supplies, telecommunications and 
transport hubs that would cause widespread disruption and damage. Therefore, the ability to analyse and critique the 
security aspects of critical infrastructure systems, together with modelling these systems visually, offers an avenue 
for assessing critical infrastructure system security and identifying vulnerabilities. Through locating these inherent 
weaknesses, appropriate solutions and remedial actions can be appraised and implemented to mitigate security risks 
to system availability and service supply. 
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